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Arkansas v. Oklahoma: Downstream
States Left without a Paddle
NEIL FAIRWEATHER*

INTRODUCTION

The importance of Arkansas v.Oklahoma lies in the Supreme Court's determination of the hierarchy of various state and
federal interests involved in water quality disputes between states
and the resulting impact on downstream states' ability to regulate
water quality.' Out of a conflict over the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) issuance of a permit to discharge waste from
a Fayetteville, Arkansas sewage treatment plant, the Court continues the trend towards the elimination of "interstate common
law."'
The conflict arose out of a downstream state's challenge of an
EPA-approved permit granting to an upstream state permission to
discharge effluent from a sewage treatment plant. The conflict implicated the Clean Water Act (the Act or CWA) and required
judicial interpretation of the function and purpose of the Act.'
Oklahoma objected to the standards set for the Arkansas sewage
treatment plant located just thirty-nine miles upstream from the
Oklahoma border.' Flow from this treatment plant passed through
seventeen miles of creeks and entered the Illinois River just
* Staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: JD.,
Class of 1995, University of Kentucky; B.A., 1989, Hanover College.
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d 595 (1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1051 (1992).
2 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that the Federal Water
Pollution Act Amendments of 1972 displaced the federal common law action at issue).
' Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1972 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter FWPCA1. The Court in Arkansas addressed the purpose of the act by commenting, "[tihe Clean Water Act anticipates a partnership between
restore and mainthe States and Federal Government, animated by a shared objective: 'to
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.'" 112 S. Ct. at
1054 (quoting FWPCA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a): Congressional Declaration of Goals
and Policy).
' Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1051. The Arkansas permit in question contained certain
limitations and conditions on the discharge, as well as a provision "that if a study then
underway indicated that more stringent limitations were necessary to ensure compliance
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twenty-two miles from the border with Oklahoma. 5 Oklahoma
challenged the permit based on a violation of Oklahoma water
quality standards. 6 The relevant sections of these standards provide that "no degradation [of water quality] shall be allowed" to
the portion of the Illinois River downstream from Arkansas. 7
The Court attempted to answer three distinct questions raised
by the parties. First, whose water quality standards should apply
to the Arkansas discharge?' Second, can the EPA mandate the
source state's compliance with downstream standards?9 And third,
if a body of water fails to meet water quality standards, does that
mean a prohibition of additional discharge of effluent? 10
This comment begins by establishing the relevant statutory
provisions in part I. Part II. examines the two cases preceding the
Arkansas v. Oklahoma decision that began the Court's trend towards minimization of state control over the quality of water entering from other states. In the first case, City of Milwaukee v.

Illinois," the Court ruled that the 1972 comprehensive amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)' 2
preempted Illinois' federal common law remedy."3 In the second

with Oklahoma's water quality standards, the permit would be modified to incorporate
those limits." Id.
I ld. Oklahoma designated the stretch of the Illinois River just downstream from the
border with Arkansas as a "scenic river." OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1452(b)(1) (Supp. 1989).
This designation appears in the Scenic Rivers Act which creates the statutory framework
for the water quality regulations at issue here. Title 82, § 1460. Describing the purpose of
the designation, the Act states that "some of the free-flowing streams and rivers of
Oklahoma possess such unique natural scenic beauty, water conservation, fish, wildlife, and
outdoor recreational values of present and future benefit to the people of the state that is
the policy of the Legislature to preserve these areas for the benefit of the people of
Oklahoma." Title 82, § 1452. The Act illustrates the effect of the designation. "Once an
area is designated as a 'scenic river area' it is an expression of legislative intent that the
stream or river in the area designated be preserved in its free-flowing condition ...
Title
82, § 1453.
o Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1051.
Id. (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1452(b)(1) (Supp. 1989)).
8 Id. at 1056 (1992).
9 Id.
Id. at 1056 (1992).
" City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
12 FWPCA § 402, 33 U.S.C. §
1342 (1972 & Supp. 1993).
" Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1053; see Maria V. Maurrasse, Comment, Oklahoma v.
EPA: Does the Clean Water Act Provide an Effective Remedy to Downstream States or Is
There Still Room Left for Federal Common Law?, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1137 (1991).
Although written prior to the Supreme Court decision in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, this comment focuses on the need for the return to federal common law since the Clean Water Act
provides inadequate remedies to downstream states.
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case, International Paper v. Ouellette,1 ' the Court followed the
City of Milwaukee ruling that the Clean Water Act' preempted
any action based on the law of the affected state. Part III. explores the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES), 16 the statutory mechanism for enforcing the water
quality standards promulgated by the EPA and the states. Part
IV. breaks down the important procedural aspects of Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, and part V. begins the detailed analysis of the decision. The conclusion focuses on how this decision affects the ability of states to set more stringent water quality standards than
those required by the EPA in an attempt to further the state policy of anti-degradation.
I.

EXAMINATION OF THE SAVINGS CLAUSE OF THE CLEAN

WATER ACT

Out of the enormity of the Clean Water Act, the Savings
Clause and the NPDES section require examination. The first of
these provisions concerns what authority under the Act Congress
has saved for the states. The Act divides the Savings Clause into
sections 505 and 510.1" The first section broadly grants authority
to private citizens:
(e) statutory or common law rights not restricted. Nothing in
this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of
persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any
other relief (including relief against the Administrator or State
agency).8
The broad language of the first savings provision, by comparison,
demonstrates the more restrictive nature of section 510.
The grant of authority to the states to regulate beyond federal standards is the most important feature of the Savings
Clause. On its face, the statute gives states a significant degree of
control over water quality. The relevant portion of section 510
states:

International Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
15 FWPCA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
Is National Pollution Discharge Elimination System § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1977
& Supp. 1993) [hereinafter NPDES].
11 International Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 485.
Is FWPCA § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
14
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Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this
chapter shall (I)preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt or enforce
(A)any standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B)any requirement respecting control or abatement of
pollution; except that if [a] limitation, . . .prohibition, .. .or
standard of performance is in effect under this chapter such
State . . .may not adopt or enforce any ... limitation, prohibition, ....
or standard of performance which is less stringent than
the . . limitation, . . . prohibition .... or standard of performance under this chapter .. .

If a state chooses to implement programs designed to eliminate
degradation of state waters, this section allows for more stringent
regulation of effluent discharged within state boundaries. The importance of this part of the comment relates to state control of
water entering from another state. If a state may establish more
stringent regulation of water quality standards than the EPA requires, how far does this grant of authority extend when the
downstream state challenges the more permissive regulation of an
upstream state?

II.

CITY OF MILWAUKEE AND INTERNATIONAL
THE STAGE FOR ARKANSAS

PAPER: SETTING

V. OKLAHOMA

Before addressing the two important predecessors to Arkan-

sas v. Oklahoma, the Court noted the frequency of controversies
between upstream states that introduce pollutants and downstream states that object."0 The Court recognized the previous application of common law principles "tempered by a respect for the

Id. (emphasis added).
Ig
See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1052 (1992). The Court briefly developed the history of these conflicts over interstate water, citing earlier cases such cases as
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (I Wheat.) 1 (1824) (disputing a monopoly granted to a ferry
company), and more recent cases like Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U.S. 335 (1980) (holding that
the boundary line between the two states was the low water mark on the northern bank of
the Ohio River). The Court also cited to older cases involving upstream and downstream
conflicts over pollution. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (attempting to
enjoin New Jersey from discharging sewage into a part of New York Harbor as a public
nuisance); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (seeking to enjoin the discharge of
Chicago sewage into the Desplaines River, alleging the eventual pollution of the Mississippi
River). The Court commented that these cases were often resolved by application of common law principles "tempered by a respect for the sovereignty of the States." Arkansas,
112 S. Ct. at 1052.
IC
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sovereignty of the States" in resolving such controversies.2" As a
means of prefacing the analysis of City of Milwaukee and International Paper, the Court described the possible preemptive impact of new federal laws and regulations on the field of common
law nuisance." This trend, as it further developed in Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, is the focus of this comment.
A. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The End of Federal Common
Law Nuisance Actions
The litigation of City of Milwaukee occurred in two stages.
First, the State of Illinois tried to file a complaint under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court against the City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I).2" The Court refused this request, stating that

"federal law applied to the dispute, one between a sovereign state
and political subdivisions of another state concerning pollution of
interstate waters, but that the various laws which Congress had
enacted 'touching the interstate waters' were 'not necessarily the
only federal remedies available.' "24 In this opinion, the Court
suggested that new federal laws may preempt the common law of
nuisance. 6 The importance of this first step lies in the Court's
recognition of the existence of federal "common law" which could
give rise to a nuisance claim caused by interstate water
pollution. 8
The case returned to the Supreme Court (Milwaukee II) after amendments to the FWPCA in 1972.27 In this later opinion,
the Court considered whether the new legislation extinguished the
previously recognized cause of action.2 8 The conflict surrounded a
series of sewer systems and two treatment plants in the County of
Milwaukee located on the shores of Lake Michigan.2 9 The problem arose after periods of wet weather caused the sewer systems,
1

Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1053.

22 Id.

21 Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).

" City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 308 (1981).

26 Id,

26 Id. at 307.

27 FWPCA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1972 & Supp. 1993). "The Amendments created a new system of regulation under which it is illegal for anyone to discharge pollutants
into the Nation's waters except pursuant to a permit." City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. at 310-11.
28 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 308
2, id.
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designed to carry both sewage and storm water runoff, to overflow
directly into Lake Michigan and its tributaries.3 Illinois' complaint alleged that pollutants entering the lake near Milwaukee31
threatened the health and welfare of its citizens. 2
Following the Supreme Court's first ruling, Illinois filed suit
in district court in May 1972 in an attempt to abate the sewage
overflow nuisance under federal common law, s as well as under
Illinois statutory and common law. 4 Only five months later, Congress established a new regulatory system designed to curb the
discharge of pollutants into interstate waterways by using a permit system that established specific effluent limitations.35 Under
these amendments to the FWPCA, the EPA must promulgate
regulations establishing specific limitations. 6 Permits issued by
the EPA, or an EPA-approved agency, must reflect these effluent
limitations.3
Despite these amendments, the district court found that Illinois had proved the existence of a nuisance under federal common
law and ordered certain actions be taken to eliminate the nuisance.3 8 On appeal to the Seventh Circuit,39 the court ruled that
"the 1972 Amendments had not preempted the federal common
law of nuisance, but that '[in] applying the federal common law of
nuisance in a water pollution case, a court should not ignore the
Act but should look to its policies and principles for guidance.' "" 0When the case again arrived in the Supreme Court, the

30

Id.

Id. The treatment plants were 25 and 39 miles away from Illinois on the shores of
I'
Lake Michigan.
32 Id. The complaint alleged that "pathogens, disease-causing viruses and bacteria, are
discharged into the lake with the overflows and inadequately treated sewage and then
transported by lake currents into Illinois water" creating a health risk. In addition, Illinois
claimed the waste entering the lake caused "eutrophication, or aging, of the lake." Id. at
309.
13 Id.
" Id. The complaint also contained claims under Illinois statutory law and common
law. The case proceeded through the district court with the state claims intact until the
court of appeals held the case should be decided exclusively under the federal common law
of nuisance, id.
15 Id. at 310.

11 Id. at 310-11.
17

Id. at 311.

38

Id.

" Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F. 2d. 151 (1979), vacated, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
"0 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 312 (quoting from the Seventh Circuit's
opinion). The Seventh Circuit felt that although the Act did not preempt the federal common law action, the Act should play a role in the action by providing insight into the
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Court based its ruling on the statutory amendments since the first
decision:
[T]he comprehensive regulatory regime created by the 1972
Amendments pre-empted Illinois' federal common law remedy.
We observed that Congress had addressed many of the problems
we had identified in Milwaukee I by providing a downstream
State with an opportunity for a hearing before the source State's
permitting agency, by requiring the latter to explain its failure
to accept any recommendations offered by the downstream
State, and by authorizing the EPA, in its discretion, to veto a
source State's issuance41of any permit if the waters of another
State may be affected.
In arguably the most limiting aspect of the opinion, the Court
responded to Illinois' argument that section 510 of the Clean
Water Act42 "expressly preserved the State's right to adopt and
'
enforce rules that are more stringent than federal standards." 43
The court of appeals accepted this argument, but the Supreme
Court interpreted the statute narrowly, remarking that it "did no
more than to save the right and jurisdiction of a state to regulate
activity occurring within the confines of its boundary waters." 4 '
This narrow reading of section 510 severely curtails the ability of
states to institute anti-degradation policies in which the right to
regulate extends only to the water that has reached the state.
The significance of this limitation to downstream states becomes more apparent after the InternationalPaper decision, but
at this stage it should be noted that the Court's ruling takes away
one historical approach to improving the quality of water entering
a downstream state. The Court in Milwaukee II did not decide
whether the 1972 Amendments also preempted state common law
remedies as well as federal common law remedies. 5

"legislature's judgment on relevant issues ... or provid[ing] an appropriate principle for
decision of the case." Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 164 (1979).
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1053 (1992).
4"FWPCA § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1977 & Supp. 1993).
"

" Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1053.
44 Id.
45 Id.
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B. International Paper v. Ouellette: The End of State Common
Law Nuisance Actions
In this case, private citizens in Vermont brought a class action suit seeking damages and injunctive relief from a paper company in New York because of pollution discharged into Lake
Champlain. 46 The pollutants entered the lake through a diffusion
pipe, running from the mill into the lake and ending a short distance before the Vermont-New York border.4 7 The suit alleged
the discharge into the lake made the water "foul, unhealthy,
smelly and ...

unfit for recreational use" and, as a result, consti-

tuted a "continuing nuisance" under Vermont common law.48
The Vermont District Court read the Savings Clause of the
Clean Water Act not to preempt entirely the rights of states to
control pollution.4 9 In deciding between several alternative interpretations of the Savings Clause, the district court held that a
state action to abate a nuisance could be maintained without conflicting with the CWA.5 0 On interlocutory appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit,"' the court affirmed the district
court's interpretation.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision below to the extent that it permitted the application of Vermont law to the litigation: "We hold that when a court considers a
state-law claim concerning interstate water pollution that is subject to the CWA, the court must apply the law of the State in
which the point source is located."6 " The significance of this limitation becomes apparent when a downstream state attempts to implement a policy of anti-degradation. After InternationalPaper,
the "nuisance" of the source state can only be abated to the extent
the pollution exceeds the source state's water quality standards.

" International Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 483-84 (1987). The plaintiffs in the
class action owned property on the Vermont side of the lake. The complaint asked for $20
million in compensatory and $100 million in punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief
that would force the paper company to correct the water treatment system responsible for
the offending discharge, id. at 484.
4" Id.
48 Id.
-9 Id.

I0
Id. at 485.
Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 776 F.2d 55, 56 (1985), affid in part. rev'd in
part, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
82 International Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 487.
1
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111. THE NPDES: THE STATUTORY MECHANISM FOR
ENFORCEMENT

In the Arkansas opinion, the Court took time to describe the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 3 and
the prescribed methods for permit issuance."4 Congress added this
section to the Clean Water Act as a part of the "complete rewriting" of the law undertaken in 1972.61 The Clean Water Act expressly prohibits the discharge of effluent until the point source
has obtained an NPDES permit.5 The section designates two possible means for issuing the NPDES permits that are required
before discharging any effluent into a "navigable body of water." 7
The EPA may approve state programs to issue the permits, or for
states without such programs, the EPA administers a federal permit program."'
A.

Permit Issuance by State Permit Programs

The NPDES authorizes states to establish a permit program
provided it satisfies certain requirements"' Section 402(b) contains some protective measures designed to protect "downstream
States." 0 Provisions contained in section 402(b) provide that the
state programs will issue permits that:
insure that any State (other than the permitting State), whose
waters may be affected by the issuance of a permit may submit
written recommendations to the permitting State (and the Administrator) with respect to any permit application and, if any
part of such written recommendations are not accepted by the
permitting State, that the permitting State will notify such affected State . . . in writing of its failure to so accept such recommendations along with its reasons for so doing."'
These provisions appear to provide little in the way of concrete
remedies or procedures to ensure source states will adopt the nec-

00

FWPCA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 13t(a) (1977 & Supp. 1993).
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1054 (1992).
1d. (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981)).
Id.

57

Id.

"

'Id,

IId. at 1054-55.

d.
"FWPCA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B)(S) (1977 & Supp. 1993).
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essary restrictions and permit limitations to maintain the water
quality standards of the downstream state.
Permit Issuance by the EPA

B.

In states without EPA-approved state permit programs, like
Arkansas, the statute provides for the same procedure described in
section 402(b) to apply.62 Downstream states must submit their
"written recommendations" to the Administrator of the EPA
"subject to the same terms, conditions and requirements as apply
".8.."3 Despite this apparent conto a state permit program .
tinuity, the EPA has required additional compliance with an older
provision in the Act. Section 401(a)(1) appears to provide safeguards in addition to section 402(a) that condition the permit issuance on compliance with downstream state water quality standards.6 These safeguard procedures apply after the Administrator
determines the proposed discharge may affect water quality in another state.6 5 After a series of regulatory back-and-forth between
the parties, if compliance remains at issue the agency "shall condition such license or permit in such a manner as may be necessary to insure compliance with applicable water quality requirements."66 At least in theory, these provisions appear to provide
added protection for downstream states from EPA-issued permits
that does not apply to state-issued permits.
These provisions, designed to protect the downstream state
from an EPA permit issuance resulting in further degradation of
water quality, hinge on determinations by the Administrator.67
This contingency provides agency discretion that threatens the
ability of states to institute successful anti-degradation programs.
Because the Administrator has discretion in implementing these
sections that require source state compliance with downstream
standards, downstream states cannot be assured their waters will
not be degraded. The significance of the NPDES permit process
enters the analysis at a later point, when limited statutory protections combine with shrinking judicial remedies to limit downstream states' ability to pursue policies of anti-degradation.

11Arkansas,

112 S. Ct. at 1055.
FWPCA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a)(3).
$I FWPCA § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (a)(2).
63
6

Id.

66 Id.
07

Id.
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DOWNSTREAM STATES
THE PROCEDURAL EVOLUTION OF ARKANSAS

V.

OKLAHOMA

The Hearing Before the Administrative Law Judge

A.

The first step in this lengthy judicial process began with
Oklahoma's challenge of the EPA permit granted to the sewage
treatment plant in Fayetteville based on the violation of
Oklahoma water quality standards."6 The administrative law
judge (ALJ) affirmed the permit based on the conclusion "that
the Oklahoma standards would not be implicated unless the contested discharge had 'something more than a mere de minimis impact' on the State's waters.6 9 He found that the discharge would
not have an 'undue impact' on Oklahoma's waters . . .,,0
B. The Petition for Review Before the EPA's Chief Judicial
Officer
After granting Oklahoma's petition for review, the Chief Judicial Officer made two rulings. 7 First, the Clean Water Act required an NPDES permit that contained any limitations necessary
to comply with the "applicable state water quality standards," and
second, the ALJ had misinterpreted the standard for protecting
the downstream state." The Chief Judicial Officer described the
standard as follows:
[A] mere theoretical impairment of Oklahoma's water quality
standards-i.e., an infinitesimal impairment predicted through
modeling but not expected to be actually detectable or measurable-should not by itself block the issuance of the permit. In this
case, the permit should be upheld if the record shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the authorized discharges would
not cause an actual
detectable violation of Oklahoma's water
73
quality standards.

On remand, the ALJ used the revised standard to determine no
detectable violation of Oklahoma's water quality standards would
68 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1051 (1992).
60 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1051-52.
"

Id. at 1052.

73

Id. at 1051.
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result from the discharge into the Illinois
River. Therefore the
74
Fayetteville permit satisfied the test.
C. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
After the final decision of the ALJ, both parties sought further review? Arkansas disagreed that the Clean Water Act required the application of Oklahoma water quality standards to the
Fayetteville permit, and Oklahoma disagreed with the finding that
no detectable violation of the Oklahoma standards would result
from the discharge under the current NPDES permit limitations.7 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case in July
1990.77
1. The Standard for Review
Before responding to the issues on appeal, the court of appeals established the standard for review of an agency decision.
The court summarized the standard as follows: "We must uphold
the agency's actions, findings, and conclusions unless they are
outside the agency's statutory authority, are not supported by substantial evidence, or are arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 78 After establishing the standard for review, the court of appeals appeared
to qualify the threshold for reversal by stating, "the agency must
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its actions including a 'rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.' "9 This standard of review
later came under heavy criticism in the Supreme Court's reversal.

74

Id.

76 Id.
76 Id.

7 Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990). The court's opinion contains a
detailed explanation of the interrelations of the affected waterways. The treatment plant in
Fayetteville planned to discharge one-half of the total effluent into the White River in
Arkansas and the other half into the Illinois River Basin. The litigation concerns only the
discharge entering the tributaries of the Illinois River. The discharge at issue entered an
unnamed creek that flows into the Muddy Creek which flows into the Clear Creek. Thirteen miles downstream the Clear Creek joins the Illinois River, twenty-two miles from the
Arkansas border. Just beyond the Arkansas border where the Illinois River enters
Oklahoma, the river flows into Lake Francis. See generally id. at 598.
78 Id. at 598.
70

Id.
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The Issues Framed

The court of appeals waded through issues framed by both
sides before narrowing the focus.8" Arkansas wanted the court to
resolve whether a state must comply with the standards of all affected downstream states before issuing an NPDES permit."s The
Oklahoma parties presented multiple issues the court classified as
"relat[ing] to the substantive issues underlying [the] procedural
question."82 After considering the concerns of both parties, the
court stated: "The ultimate concern posed to this court is whose
water quality standards take precedence under the Clean Water
Act . . . the upstream state's, the downstream state's, the federal
government's or nobody's." 83
3. The Holding
The court of appeals surprised everyone by reversing the
EPA's permit on a theory none of the parties advanced. 84 First,
the court dismissed the conclusions of the Chief Judicial Officer
that the standard established by the Act depended on whether the
discharge resulted in "a detectable change in water quality." Instead the court held, "We believe that, where a proposed source
would discharge effluents that would contribute to conditions currently constituting a violation of applicable water quality standards, such proposed source may not be permitted." 8 5 This interpretation of the Act would eliminate the need for a challenging
downstream state to show that the proposed permit would result
in any detectable change.
Second, the court decided the existing condition of the Illinois
River "currently constituted a violation of applicable water quality standards," and since the Fayetteville effluent could reach the
Illinois River beyond the Arkansas border," "the plant can be expected to contribute to the ongoing deterioration of the scenic
river ... ."'I The court saw the present degraded condition of the
10 Id. at 600-01.
81
12

84

Id.

Id. at 601.
I'Id. at 602.

Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1051 (1992).

Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 620 (10th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
86

Id. at 629. The Court found "substantial evidence that Fayetteville's effluent will be

transported downstream to Oklahoma." Id.
87 Id.
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Illinois River as a missing factor of the Chief Judicial Officer's
holding. The court "conclude[d] that no state 'imposes' its standards on another state, but rather that the Clean Water Act mandated compliance with federal law, including the federally approved water quality standards of affected states." 88
D.

The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in an unanimous
opinion, reversed the decision of the court of appeals. The Court
concluded that the court of appeals had "made a policy choice
that it was not authorized to make.""
V.

BEGINNING THE DISSECTION: ANALYSIS OF ARKANSAS
OKLAHOMA

V.

The Court began by first addressing the three questions posed
by the different parties. 90 Second, the Court questioned the holding of the court of appeals that the EPA's issuance qualified as
"arbitrary and capricious." 9 Finally, the Court discussed the
three errors the court of appeals made in reversing the issuance of
the EPA's Fayetteville permit.92
A.

The Three Questions

The Court divided the first part of its analysis into "three
analytically distinct questions" concerning the interpretation of
the Clean Water Act and argued by the parties at the various
stages in the litigation."
1. The First Question
"[D]oes the Act require the EPA, in crafting and issuing a
permit to a point source in one State, to apply the water quality
standards of downstream States?" 9 ' The Court chose not to an-

Id. at 602.
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1061 (1992).
*0 Id. at 1056.
"

8

"

Id. at 1058

92

Id. at 1060.

'

Id. at 1056.

Id.

1993-941

DOWNSTREAM STATES

swer this question, dismissing it as "neither necessary or prudent
for us to resolve." The Court explained the dismissal:
In issuing the Fayetteville permit, the EPA assumed it was obligated by both the Act and its own regulations to ensure that the
Fayetteville discharge would not violate Oklahoma's standards.

As we discussed below, this assumption was permissible and reasonable and therefore there is no need for us to address whether
the Act requires as much. 96

Reviewing the history of the case, the EPA's "assumption"
remained difficult to discern. While the initial permit did include
a provision calling for modification of the permit limits if a future
study showed noncompliance with the Oklahoma water quality
standards, the EPA issued the permit without knowing whether
the discharge would violate the Oklahoma standards." The EPA
administrative law judge ruled that a later study must show more
than a "de minimis impact" in order to implicate the Oklahoma
standards.9" The EPA may have assumed that the permit must
consider the Oklahoma water quality standards, but the definition
of "violation" leaves room for further degradation of Oklahoma's
water quality.
2.

The Second Question

The Court prefaced the second question with an attempt to
define the analysis by distinguishing between not deciding the
scope of the agency's obligations under the Act and deciding the
scope of the agency's authority under the Act.9 9 The Court illustrated the difference: "Even if the Clean Water Act itself does not
require the Fayetteville discharge to comply with Oklahoma's
water quality standards, the statute clearly does not limit the
EPA's authority to mandate such compliance.""'
"[Elven if the Act does not require as much, does the Agency
have a statutory authority to mandate such compliance?"'I" The
Court answered "yes," upholding the EPA's requirement that the

99 Id.

91Id. (citations omitted).
97Id. at 1051.
98 Id.
IId. at 1056.
-w Id.

101Id.
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Fayetteville discharge comply with Oklahoma's water quality
standards. "Those regulations ... constitute reasonable exercise of
the Agency's statutory authority. 1 0 2 The Court provided statutory support for this conclusion:
Congress has vested in the administrator broad discretion to establish conditions for NPDES permits. Section 402(a)(2) provides that for EPA-issued permits "[tihe Administrator shall
prescribe conditions for such permits to assure compliance with
the requirements of [§ 402(a)(1)] . . . and such other requirements as he deems appropriate." Similarly, Congress preserved
for the Administrator broad authority to oversee state permit
programs: "No permit shall issue . . . if the Administrator...
objects in writing to the issuance of such permit as0 being
outside
3
the guidelines and requirements of this chapter.'
The Court indicated the EPA has the discretion to require that
Oklahoma's water quality standards be incorporated in the Fayetteville permit, but the EPA is not required to exercise that discretion. Combining the Court's reluctance to interpret the Clean
Water Act as requiring the EPA to consider the standards of "all
affected states" with the broad discretion of the EPA, downstream
states gain little predictability from this ruling. 10 4
This aspect of the Court's ruling ran contrary to the position
taken by the State of Arkansas. Arkansas argued that the Court's
holding in InternationalPaperv. Ouellette,"0' 5 concerning the role
of "affected states" in the permit process, precluded the holding
now that the EPA can incorporate the water quality standards of
Oklahoma into the Fayetteville permit.' 0 6 In InternationalPaper,
the Court described the role of the affected states as follows:
While source States have a strong voice in regulating their own
pollution, the CWA contemplates a much lesser role for States
that share an interstate waterway with the source (the affected
states). Even though it may be harmed by the discharges, an
affected State only has an advisory role in regulating pollution
that originates beyond its border . . . . Thus the Act makes it

'02 Id. (emphasis added).

103Id.
1" FWPCA § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1977 & Supp. 1993).
105 479 U.S. 481 (1987).

'0' Arkansas, 112 5. Ct. at 1056-57.
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position to source
clear that affected states occupy a subordinate
10 7
states in the federal regulatory program.
The Court distinguished this description by contrasting the affected state's input in the permit process with "the EPA's authority to require a point source to comply with downstream water
quality standards." ' 8 The Court made the simple distinction between the affected states not having the authority to impose standards on an upstream state and the EPA having authority to
choose to include the downstream state's standards in the source
state's permit.
Arkansas also argued that regulations requiring compliance
with downstream states' water quality standards conflict with the
legislative history of the Act. The Court responded that the legislative history does indicate that Congress intended to give the Administrator "discretion in his oversight of the issuance of NPDES
permits" and further noted that nothing in the legislative history
indicates that Congress intended to "preclude the EPA from establishing a general requirement that such permits be conditioned
water quality
with downstream
to ensure compliance
standards."' 0 9
Overall, the Court's response to "question two" conceded that
the EPA can require a source state to comply with the water quality standards of a downstream state. Unfortunately, the Administrator's broad discretion removes any predictability for the downstream state. This factor, combined with the statutory restrictions
that limit a downstream state's participation in the source state's
permit process, leaves the affected states at the will of the EPA.
This renders the implementation of anti-degradation policies
adopted by states with shared interstate waterways ineffective to
the extent that the state has no power to affect the quality of
water entering from outside.
The Third Question
"[D]oes the Act provide, as the Court of Appeals held, that
once a body of water fails to meet water quality standards no discharge that yields effluents that reach the degraded waters will be
International Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 490-91.
Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1057.
,09
Id.
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permitted?"' 1 0 The Court said "no," finding essentially that the
decision of the court of appeals was unsupported by any authority
in the Act. The court of appeals recognized "its theory 'has apparently never before been addressed by a federal court.' ""' In support of this theory, the court of appeals cited section 402(h), 2 of
the CWA." 3 This section prohibits publicly owned treatment
plants from accepting further pollutants after the discharge has
violated the NPDES permit limits. " 4 The Court found this reasoning tenuous, stating that "[tihe parties have pointed to nothing

that mandates a complete ban on discharges into a waterway that
is in violation of [water quality] standards. 1 1

5

In striking down

the prohibition against further degradation, the Court concluded:
[RIather than establishing the categorical ban announced by the
Court of Appeals-which might frustrate the construction of
new [treatment] plants that would improve existing conditions-the Clean Water Act vests in the EPA and the States
broad authority to develop long-range, area-wide programs to alleviate existing pollution .

.

. To the extent that the Court of

Appeals relied on its interpretation of the Act to reverse the
EPA's permitting decision, that reliance was misplaced. 1 6
The answer to "question three" has the most restrictive impact of
the decision. The court of appeals attempted to fill in some of the
gaps left in the statutory scheme with a bright line rule, and the
Supreme Court rejected it in favor of recognizing the broad discretion of the EPA. While the CWA speaks of impact on "affected states,""' 7 the Act fails to define what would constitute sufficient impact to require the EPA to alter or amend the upstream
permit. The rejection of the bright line standard set forth by the
court of appeals has the effect of relinquishing this question to the
broad statutory discretion of the EPA.
110 Id.

at 1056.
"I Id. at 1058 (quoting from Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d. 595, 620 n.39 (10th Cir.
1990)).

FWPCA § 402(h), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h) (1977 & Supp. 1993).
Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1058.

FWPCA § 402(h), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h).
"I Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1058.
"I ld.
FWPCA § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2).
"'
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Arbitrary and Capricious?

The Court next turned its attention to the court of appeal's
erroneous determination that the EPA's issuance of the Fayetteville permit qualified as "arbitrary and capricious" because the
permit relied on a misinterpretation of the Oklahoma water quality standards.1 18 The Court identified the different interpretations
of the CWA advanced by the court of appeals and the EPA as the
primary factor resulting in the incorrect determination that the
Agency had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."' The
divergence in the two interpretations surrounded the court of appeal's reading of the Oklahoma statute to include the same "prohibition" against further discharge into presently degraded water,
as the Court read in the CWA.12 0 The EPA did not interpret the
Act, or the Oklahoma standards, to contain such a prohibition.
The Supreme Court also disagreed with the interpretation advanced by the court of appeals because the court "exceeded the
legitimate scope of judicial review of an agency adjudication." '
The Supreme Court first commented on the soundness of the
EPA's interpretation and application of the Oklahoma standards
and then on the approach of the court of appeals.1 2 The theory
developed by the Court to support the interpretation of the EPA
equates the Oklahoma standards for water quality with federal
law. The Court relied on the NPDES regulations that require the
permits "to comply 'with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States' " to suggest that any state water
quality standards the EPA determines to be "applicable" become
incorporated into federal law. 12 3 In other words, because the EPA
sets the guidelines the states use to design water quality standards, these standards have characteristics of federal law, and as a
interpretaresult, courts should approach the EPA's reasonable
1 24
tions of these standards with substantial deference.
The Court then concluded that the AU had reviewed the evidence concerning the possible impact the Fayetteville plant might
ill Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1058.
19 Id. The Court contrasted the interpretations but held that the court of appeals
exceeded the legitimate scope of judicial review of an agency adjudication, id.
120 Id.

121

Id.

122

Id.

14

Id. at 1058-59 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (1991)).
Id. at 1059.
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have on water quality in Oklahoma with sufficient scrutiny to justify the decision.' The ALJ reviewed four different measures'
of water quality under the Oklahoma standards and concluded the
plant would not violate the standards. 27 Based on the finding that
the ALJ acted in substantial evidence, the Supreme Court ruled
that the court of appeals should have affirmed the EPA's
interpre1 28
tation of the statute and the issuance of the permit.
The Court does not hesitate to criticize the interstate impact
of accepting the court of appeal's interpretation, noting, "[I1f
every discharge that had some theoretical impact in a downstream
State were interpreted as 'degrading' the downstream waters,
downstream States might wield an effective veto over upstream
discharges."' 29 The Court may have overstated the effect of using
the court of appeal's "degraded" standard as a "veto." This result
would only happen in situations where the downstream state has
stringent standards and the source state has permissive standards.
In this hypothetical arrangement, the source state may decide that
the costs of compliance would exceed the benefits of the permit
and seek a less expensive alternative. Adjoining states with compatible water quality standards would not necessarily wield such a
veto over each other's permits.
The Court's approach to this problem tends to assess the
costs of anti-degradation policies to the downstream states. Simply
put, if a downstream state wishes to improve the quality of its

125Id.
125 Id. at 1059 nn.15-18. The ALJ reviewed four measures from the Oklahoma water
quality standards: eutrophication, aesthetics, dissolved oxygen and metals. First, eutrophi-

cation is the aging process of lakes, where algae and other plant life become so abundant
because of the presence of nutritive compounds that the lake cannot support life, id. The
ALJ determined that the Fayetteville discharge of phosphorus would not contribute to this

problem, id. Second, regarding aesthetics the ALJ found Fayetteville's discharge of phosphorus would not impact significantly, id. Third, the ALJ found the thirty-nine miles of
river between the plant and the border would be sufficient distance for complete oxygen
recovery, id. Finally, the ALJ found the level of metals discharged from the Fayetteville
plant would not violate the Oklahoma standards, id.; see also William H. Holmell, Comment, The Impact of Arkansas v. Oklahoma on the NPDES Process Under the Clean

Water Act, 23 ENVTL. L. 273, 292 (1993). "The apparent impact of Arkansas is that EPAapproved water quality standards of a downstream state will be applied to an upstream
discharger if there is an 'actual detectable or measurable' violation of the downstream
state's water quality." Id. at 292 (quoting Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1052).
127 Id. at 1060.
In Id.
12,Id. at 1059.
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water and an upstream state contributes to the degradation of
downstream waters, the downstream state must bear the cost.
C.

The Three Mutually-Compounding Errors

1. The First Error
First, the court of appeals failed to give deference to the
EPA's interpretation of its own regulations and instead relied on
its own interpretation of the CWA. 180 The Court found the earlier
discussed prohibition against discharge into a degraded waterway
an unacceptable interpretation of the language of the Act. The
Court followed by concluding that "the Court of Appeals sat in
review of an agency action and should have afforded the EPA's
interpretation of the governing law an appropriate level of deference.'' 13 Considering the weak statutory basis upon which the
court of appeals relied in its decision to strike out in a new direction, the Court did not hesitate to rule that the new interpretation
fell outside the recognized limits of appellate review.
2.

The Second Error

The Court found that the court of appeals failed to apply the
correct standard for reviewing the fact finding of an agency by
misinterpreting the "substantial evidence standard" and substituted its own factual findings.132 Pointing to several references in
the opinion in which the court of appeals referred to " 'substantial
evidence before the ALJ to support' [the] particular findings
which the court thought appropriate, but which were contrary to
those actually made by the ALJ," the Court concluded that the
court of appeals had breached the standard for agency review. 188
Characterizing this breach, the Court described the actions of the
court of appeals as "supplant[ing] the agency's findings merely by
identifying alternative findings that could be supported by substantial evidence." 134 The court of appeals went out on a limb, and
the Supreme Court sawed it off. Good intentions aside, the court
1SOId. at 1060.
"'

Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467

U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)).
132 Id.
133
'34

Id.
Id.
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of appeals did not have statutory authority to reverse the EPA's
permit issuance.
3.

The Third Error

The Court identified the third error as the determination by
the court of appeals that the EPA acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, contrary to established principles of agency review."3 5 All three of these errors involved the court of appeals failing to respect the discretion of the EPA, indicating the Supreme
Court's perception of how significant a role the EPA has in the
scheme of the CWA.
CONCLUSION

Where does Arkansas v. Oklahoma leave the downstream
state? If a state wants to implement water quality standards reflecting a policy of anti-degradation, the Savings Clause of the
CWA allows the state to regulate beyond federal requirements.
But, if a state wishes to further the policy of anti-degradation by
ensuring shared interstate waterways remain within its pollution
limits, the CWA offers little assistance. Before City of Milwaukee, a downstream state could institute a nuisance action against
the source state in federal court, but the Court in City of Milwaukee ruled that the CWA preempted this action. Before International Paper, a downstream state could institute a state nuisance
action against the source state, but the Court in InternationalPaper ruled that the law of the source state, not the downstream
state, controls such disputes. Now the Supreme Court in Arkansas v. Oklahoma interpreted the CWA to grant broad discretion
to the EPA in setting standards for discharge permits, further limiting the options of the downstream state. A downstream state
now faces upstream pollution with the option of writing a letter to
the Administrator or offending state and waiting to see what happens. This unanimous decision by the Supreme Court continues
the trend towards limiting the power of states to regulate water
quality beyond the federal standards and favoring the EPA.

'36

Id.

